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Jelena Vasiljević
The possibilities and constraints 
of engaging solidarity in citizenship
Abstract   In a broader sense, this article is interested in solidarity as a politi-
cally operational concept. To be able to answer more general questions – like 
What does it mean to base a political community on the principles of solidarity? Can 
acts of solidarity be used not only to help (support) others, but with the aim to change 
power relations and constitute new political orders as well? – we must first situate 
solidarity in relation to some already established frameworks of thinking about 
the political community. It is within theories and models of citizenship that I want 
to situate my exploration of the political value of solidarity in this paper. Firstly, 
if we want to go beyond isolated gestures and actions of solidarity, to question 
its general capacities for political reordering, we need to firmly anchor it in broad 
concepts that capture the ideals and visions of political community. Without a 
doubt, citizenship is one such concept. Secondly, there is hardly a theory or ap-
proach to citizenship that does not presuppose some aspects of solidarity as 
foundational. Finally, and closely related to the previous point, citizenship and 
solidarity, although often conceptually intertwined, form a paradoxical duo, re-
flecting further potential paradoxes that may arise from endeavours to engage 
solidarity as a political principle. In short, citizenship is a simultaneously inclusive 
and exclusive notion, incorporating the idea that some sort of boundary encircles 
a body of citizens (most often, but not exclusively, nation-state boundaries), 
despite the fact that solidarity loses much of its meaning when expected to 
operate and be exercised within certain imposed limits.
Keywords: solidarity, citizenship, citizenship rights, equality, justice, global 
citizenship
New ‘solidarity talk’
Solidarity is on everyone’s lips these days. Whether the news is about col-
lapsed national economies, natural catastrophes – which seem to be growing 
in number due to rapid climate change – or the emergent refugee crisis 
caused by wars in the Middle East, all around the world we hear pleas for 
solidarity with an ever-growing number of people who have lost their jobs, 
their homes, their savings, their safety and their loved ones. Media and 
social networks are flooded with stories of ‘ordinary’ citizens providing 
shelter and food to those in need; stories that speak as much about human 
compassion as they do about the failure of state and international institu-
tions. Moreover, these acts of solidarity – depicted in such a way as to 
counter the effects of mainstream policies – are sometimes presented as 
models for the potential, and allegedly better, socio-economic arrangements 
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we should be striving for, in other words, as politically instructive.1 The 
topic of this article is a broad one, and hence will be touched upon frag-
mentally – mostly as an appeal to further rethink proposed frameworks 
and problems – namely, in terms of how can we think about solidarity as 
a politically operational concept. What does it mean to base a political 
community on the principles of solidarity? Can acts of solidarity be used 
not only to help (support) others, but with the aim to change power relations 
and constitute new political orders as well? In other words, can solidarity 
be political? If so, is it justifiable to claim solidarity for progressive, eman-
cipatory political projects only, or can it equally be part of a conservative, 
right-wing agenda?
The idea of relating solidarity to political community is hardly a new one, 
as many political theories (most notably anarchist, communist and socialist, 
but others as well) rely on specific visions of solidarity as the cohesive force 
that turns individuals into members of society. However, there have been 
very few attempts, especially in more recent political and social theories, 
to discuss solidarity from a theoretical point of view and to provide a coher-
ent framework that explains the role of solidarity in constituting the fibre 
of a political community (Hechter 1988, Bayertz 1999, Arnspenger and 
Varoufakis 2003, Scholz 2008). Moreover, social theory interpretations of 
solidarity have predominantly viewed it as a given feature of every group 
or as the essence of cooperative behaviour. For instance, both mechanical 
and organic solidarity are assumed in Durkheim’s account, emerging from 
the particular character of individuals and groups (Durkheim 1991). It is 
usually also presumed that solidarity takes place between actors who are 
alike, or, as in rational choice theory, who strive to achieve the same goal. 
In other words, these accounts do not treat solidarity as created, agitated 
for, and as transformative – capable of challenging and establishing politi-
cal and social orders. The contexts mentioned at the beginning of this text, 
which have brought the topic of solidarity to the surface (again), have 
mostly generated writing that positions solidarity as a corrective and ne-
glected aspect of interpersonal behaviour, now advocated as a tool for 
overcoming the consequences of the current capitalist and liberal-repre-
sentative models of governance (Bauman 2013). In a way, they can be said 
to be part of a new wave of utopian thinking.
However, this emerging ‘solidarity talk’ is not without opposition. There is 
strong criticism – even from within the strain of thought focused on alter-
native ways of organizing modern communities in the face of imminent 
economic, geo-political and climate dangers – regarding whether ‘better’ 
1  See for instance http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/23/greece-soli-
darity-movement-cooperatives-syriza, and http://greecesolidarity.org/?page_id=1114, 
last accessed on Feb 1 2016. 
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societies can be founded on principles of solidarity. Critics say that solidarity 
is insufficiently political, relying primarily on instantaneous individual or 
group reactions and on human emotions instead of on systemic, institu-
tional solutions; or that it is something of a companion to neoliberal policies 
– for, with the implosion of the welfare state and the significant depletion, 
or even outright abandonment, of policies designed to help the poor, im-
migrants, and those less-fortunate, direct solidarity among people has 
emerged to fill institutional gaps. This is said to be in accordance with neo-
liberal principles of governance, as it fits the formula, ‘do it yourself,’ and 
is why some have highlighted the co-optation of concepts usually thought 
of as radical or anti-establishment, like active citizenship and direct action, 
but also solidarity, into mainstream politics (Joseph 2013). My contention 
here is that in order to fully explore the political dimension of solidarity, we 
must first situate the concept in relation to some (preferably many) already 
established frameworks of thinking about the political community.
Solidarity and citizenship – a paradoxical alliance
It is within theories and models of citizenship that I want to situate my 
(limited) exploration of the political value of solidarity. There are a couple 
of reasons for this. Firstly, if we want to go beyond isolated gestures and 
actions of solidarity, to question its general capacities for political reorder-
ing, we need to firmly anchor it in broad concepts that capture the ideals 
and visions of political community. Without a doubt, citizenship is one such 
concept. Secondly, as I will shortly elaborate in more detail, there is hardly 
a theory or approach to citizenship that does not presuppose some aspects 
of solidarity as foundational. Finally, and closely related to the previous 
point, citizenship and solidarity, although often conceptually intertwined, 
form a paradoxical duo, reflecting further potential paradoxes that may 
arise from endeavours to engage solidarity as a political principle. In short, 
citizenship is a simultaneously inclusive and exclusive notion, incorporating 
the idea that some sort of boundary encircles a body of citizens (most often, 
but not exclusively, nation-state boundaries), despite the fact that solidarity 
loses much of its meaning when expected to operate and be exercised 
within certain imposed limits. I will return to this point briefly, too.
Citizenship is an indispensable element of every political community: en-
compassing dimensions of statuses, rights and identities (Joppke 2007),2 
it serves as every polity’s “legal foundation and social glue” (Shafir 1998: 
2  Shaw and Štiks (2012: 317) have noticed a tendency among citizenship studies 
scholars to use triadic divisions when explaining constitutive elements of citizenship. 
Similar to Joppke’s division, authors like Wiener, Bauböck, and Bellamy have used, 
respectively: rights, access and belonging; membership, rights and practices; rights, 
belonging and participation. 
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3). It is “intimately linked to the ideas of individual entitlement on the one 
hand and of attachment to a particular community on the other” (Kymlicka 
and Norman 1995: 283). Above all, it is a relational concept with three 
constitutive elements: individual, community, and the relationship between 
them (Wiener 1999: 199). Thus, transcending issues of legal and formal 
statuses and rights (as well as obligations), citizenship is pertinent to 
wider social questions of who belongs (who ought to belong; under which 
rules), who is left out (and why), what types of relationships co-citizens 
form, what kinds of relationships exist between citizens and the state, and 
the nature of relations between citizens and non-citizens. These relation-
ships are not only the result of policies and constitutional settings, but to 
a large extent are shaped, directed and mediated by public discourse and 
widely-shared narratives, in which the motif of solidarity plays an important 
role. The idea of solidarity with co-ethnics or with other co-nationals under 
the same state institutions helped underpin national citizenship in its mod-
ern inceptions (Brubaker 1992). Social citizenship (rights to education, 
health and social protection, etc.), implemented through an institutional 
distribution of national wealth, is built on ideas of egalitarianism and 
solidarity with less-fortunate co-citizens; multicultural citizenship, in its 
quest for the recognition of differences, accentuates solidarity within ethnic 
and religious groups; and so on.
Solidarity thus, as a discursive trope, can be found in different narratives 
and interpretative frameworks to purport different ideas and ideals of 
citizenship, as the latter remains conceptually heavily indebted to the former. 
However, solidarity’s role is often only presupposed, or taken for granted, 
and rarely thematized as a consistent feature of interpersonal relations that 
demands its systematic place in citizenship. The two basic models, or genera-
tive “ideals of citizenship” (Pocock 1998), namely republican and liberal 
– both developed in ancient times, in Greece and Rome, respectively – en-
visioned strong communal ties that enabled the birth of citizenship, but 
accentuated other features that had to do more with individuals as citizens 
than with the relationship between them. The republican vision of zoon 
politikon valued the citizen as free and agentic (a property-owning male, 
needless to say), “capable of ruling and being ruled,” as Aristotle famous-
ly put it. The Roman citizen gradually evolved into legalis homo, a man 
whose rights are acknowledged and protected. Both traditions are echoed in 
today’s understanding of citizens as free, right-bearing members of society 
and agents in their political communities, but what role has solidarity played 
in the evolution of these ideas?
Throughout modern history, citizenship has developed a space for struggle 
– for inclusion into the political community and for the protection of rights, 
which have gradually been seen as inseparable from the essence of what 
it means to be human. Equality and inclusion have thus become principles 
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propelling the fight to secure and expand citizenship rights. It was social 
contract theories that posited, albeit in different ways, that the natural state 
of human beings, gathered together in a community, mandated that some 
natural and inalienable rights be recognized. The American and the French 
revolutions, by way of the United States Constitution and the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme 
et du Citoyen), transformed, even if only declaratively, all acknowledged 
members of the community into equal citizens. Though many remained 
outside this citizenry, most notably slaves and women, a new ideal of citi-
zenship was set and a new era in the fight for citizenship rights was ready 
to begin. Citizenship struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries, exemplified 
in movements like abolitionism and the fight for universal suffrage, further 
accentuated the ideals of equality and solidarity. Abolitionism and the suf-
frage movement especially relied on principles of solidarity, as they were 
international movements, in which there was an even greater need for 
transnational ties, mutual recognition and support, and the capacity to put 
mass pressure on national governments.
Solidarity and citizenship grew conceptually closer as a consequence of 
two historical trends. On one hand, solidary networks, built across nation-
states, emerged from the common fight for equal citizenship. On the other 
hand, those very struggles helped stabilize the notion of national citizenship, 
and the nation-state as its container – where solidarity was needed among 
citizens (of a nation) – and was often strengthened and maintained with 
the help of nationalist ideologies. In a way, this intra-national solidarity 
worked to undermine international forms of solidarity, especially when the 
latter threatened to work against the interests of the nation-states them-
selves. This is how Balibar (1988) explains the role of the rise of equal 
citizenship in suppressing the international workers’ movement:
“...[n]ationalism is entirely constituted in its modern form in the context 
of the class struggle and the ‘social question’ which it has tended to con-
trol and, if possible, to supplant. The denial of class identity and the af-
firmation of national identity go hand in hand... [t]he recognition of 
‘universal suffrage’ is closely coupled with imperialism... The ‘dangerous 
classes’ have been allowed access to citizenship – let alone begun to have 
their workers’ rights acknowledged as one of its necessary components 
– only on condition that they transform themselves into constituent parts 
of the ‘body’ of the nation, and therefore into (real or imaginary) masters 
or, more exactly, foreman of imperialist domination.” (Balibar 1988: 726)
We can already see how solidarity and citizenship, and especially solidar-
ity within citizenship, form a peculiar dynamic. However, the historical 
experience of two world wars, together with the turbulent inter-war period 
– during which unprecedented waves of migration occurred when tens of 
thousands were stripped of their humanity, primarily because they were 
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stripped of their citizenship statuses – strengthened the argument for citi-
zenship as “the right to have rights” (Arendt 1951). Then, the post-World 
War II political order of the West and the triumph of the welfare state so-
lidified the role of solidarity in consolidating citizenship. This is particu-
larly highlighted in T. H. Marshall’s famous essay (1998) on “Citizenship 
and the Social Class,” where he outlined the history of citizenship in Great 
Britain as the history of the struggle between capitalism, which stratifies 
society, and citizenship rights, which aim to bring equality to all, and con-
cluded with an optimistic look at the then-present epoch, in which social 
citizenship (equal access to health care, education and other social services) 
had allegedly transformed the whole population of post-war Britain into 
one class of citizens.
Solidarity in citizenship, thus, in our recent history, has mostly meant the 
acceptance of new social contracts by which some portion of accumulated 
wealth is distributed (mostly through taxation) in such a way as to accom-
modate the ideal of an equal citizenry. However, as we know, this social 
contract has been challenged for quite some time, as has the idea of a 
universal citizenship exemplified in Marshall’s essay. These challenges, 
along with attempts at reframing citizenship, which I will outline briefly 
below, have given new meaning to citizenship solidarity as well.
New social movements, coupled with a rise in identity politics from the 
1960s onward, destabilized universal citizenship and its ideals of equal 
political and social rights. Culture and identities became new sites of strug-
gle, as the claim that the so-called universal citizen actually has gender, 
ethnicity, and religion – namely, that s/he is not universal at all – grew 
stronger (Nash 2000). This questioning of formal/legal equality, said to 
mask unrecognized inequalities, transformed the dominant understanding 
of the political within citizenship, and gave rise to new calls for solidarity 
among minorities and repressed groups. An overall cultural turn and an 
increasing prominence of politics of recognition reframed the struggle for 
citizenship rights, most notably with advocacies for different rights for dif-
ferently disadvantaged groups through new normative models such as 
group-differentiated citizenship and multicultural citizenship (Marion Young 
1989, Kymlicka 1995). This opened up new debates on the place and role 
of solidarity as a cohesive force in citizenship. Whereas proponents of dif-
ferent variants of multicultural citizenship insist on the need for solidarity 
with those who feel excluded and marginalized – solidarity that presumes 
acceptance of special rights, exemption from certain laws, and cultural 
sensitivity in public domains and discourses – critics point to the ghettoiza-
tion of citizens and a consequent loss of solidarity bonds with the wider 
citizenry (Carens 2000, Barry 2001, Phillips 1999). This shift from ‘old’ to 
‘new’ notions of citizenship solidarity, therefore, was a result of the shift 
from redistribution to recognition (Fraser 1995). Indeed, although Kymlicka 
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(2009), for instance, insisted that the fight for different sets of rights (social 
or cultural) cannot be seen as a “zero sum game”, it is hard not to notice 
the decoupling of cultural issues from socio-economic ones that coincides 
with the rise of politics of identities (Phillips 1999) and the “relative eclipse” 
of social politics by cultural politics (Fraser 1997: 2). Or, as Joppke put it: 
“With the ethnic diversification of society the basis for social rights becomes 
brittle while other types of rights move to the fore: rights of anti-discrimi-
nation and multicultural recognition.” (Joppke 2007: 38-39).
Besides these shifts within the paradigm of citizenship rights and entitle-
ments, a re-conceptualization of citizenship has also occurred vis-à-vis 
processes of globalization. The flourishing of concepts like cosmopolitan 
citizenship, post-national citizenship, de-national citizenship, etc. (Bosniak 
2000, Soysal 1998) indicate that modern conditions of accelerated globali-
zation impact our way of thinking about the place and role of individual 
citizens in a world that is no longer dominated exclusively by nation-states, 
but also by global interests, international institutions and politics, and 
ever growing flows of people and capital. Here, I want to single out two 
concepts of citizenship that rely on such insights and demand the appropriate 
regulation of citizens’ rights and duties to accommodate emerging global 
conditions. Ecological citizenship stresses the need for the just distribution 
of ecological space and suggests new international politico-legal regulations, 
based on ecological footprints, where those with greater footprints would 
be legally accountable to those whose access to natural resources is limited 
or endangered. As Andrew Dobson argues (1995; 2004), we need to think of 
these regulations in terms of citizenship, since access to shared ecological 
space concerns us all as citizens and should therefore be regulated as a 
political issue. Even though citizens around the world participate in a single 
ecological community, access to and use of ecological resources is not equal, 
and the distribution of those resources is not just. Therefore, the regulations 
of ecological citizenship would impose obligations and reparation measures 
on those with a larger ecological impact (the subjects of this obligation-
centred citizenship are primarily states).
Another example of a global citizenship model, again with a stronger focus 
on obligations, is the proposition of Isin and Turner (2007) for a global 
system of taxation on different kinds of transnational mobilities, which 
would create an international fund to alleviate the consequences of global 
catastrophes and at the same time strengthen the mutual rights and duties 
of all citizens in the world:
“If people started, albeit in a modest way, to pay for their rights and to 
contribute through taxation to the common good at a global level, human 
rights would become a more tangible part of everyday life. The ‘ordinary 
man and woman’ would feel involved in global projects to prevent famine 
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and drought, and they would begin acting as cosmopolitan citizens. Without 
a cosmopolitan taxation system, the UN will continue to be largely de-
pendent on US funding and generosity, both of which have been declining 
anyway. Without these changes, human rights will be subject to the 
criticism that they are fake rights because they do not correspond to 
duties.” (ibid: 16)
This overview of various conjunctions between citizenship and solidarity 
treats the latter in an unusual way given that one of its most common features 
– namely internationalism – is not thematized. This is due to the unique role 
solidarity plays in strengthening the sense of membership and belonging 
within citizenship. Bearing that in mind, and even though solidarity figures 
as a necessary rhetorical tool for different variants of citizenship (national, 
welfare, multicultural, global, etc.), we could perhaps assert that it is in fact 
incommensurable with the notion of citizenship. Citizenship functions simul-
taneously as an inclusionary and exclusionary concept, because it “in itself 
embodies legalized discrimination, since it presupposes a legitimate distinction 
between citizens and non-citizens” (Dedić, Jalušić and Zorn 2003: 25). The 
exception to this is found in the last two examples above, but it must be 
stressed that they represent only theoretical models and that they face strong 
criticism – together with other models of ‘alternative’ or ‘hyphenated citizen-
ships’ – by scholars who insist that the concept of citizenship only functions 
within real existing political communities and is operative only when it 
indicates state membership (Joppke 2007; Oommen 1997).
Can solidarity, then, play any constitutive role in building social and po-
litical relations if boundaries defining who is included are set in advance? 
Or could we claim that the political engagement of solidarity actually in-
strumentalises its powerful connotations to mask other political imperatives 
and motives? Here, we are dangerously approaching the problematic claim 
of a true nature of solidarity and we could perhaps engage in a different, 
non-exclusionary way. But, again, could it be for political purposes, given 
that political community always implies (exclusionary) boundaries? Or 
should we presume that citizenship can indeed be applicable to global, 
transnational contexts? Below, I will focus on some of the defining features 
of solidarity itself and will then return to the question of its relationship 
with citizenship.
What kind of engagement is solidarity 
and can it help build political institutions?
To be able to deal further with the questions raised above, we need to 
define what types of relationships could be said to take the form of solidar-
ity. First, we must differentiate between solidarity and other forms of 
empathic behaviour. Discussing the differences between pity, compassion 
and solidarity in her book On Revolution, Hannah Arendt remarks:
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“It is out of pity that men are ‘attracted toward les hommes faibles’, but 
it is out of solidarity that they establish deliberately and, as it were, dis-
passionately a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited… 
For solidarity, because it partakes of reason, and hence of generality, is 
able to comprehend a multitude conceptually, not only the multitude of 
a class or a nation or a people, but eventually all mankind… Termino-
logically speaking, solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide 
action, compassion is one of the passions, and pity is a sentiment.” (Arendt 
1990: 88-89).
It is not only the nature of affection and action that sets solidarity apart 
from other empathic impulses, it is also the nature of the relationships it 
builds. So, let us consider further how solidarity differs from charity. One 
of the defining traits of solidarity, I would argue, is an implicit levelling 
that occurs between the parties involved, and this is where the difference 
between charity and solidarity resides – in the principle of equality. Char-
ity does not imply a critique of existing hierarchies; it merely ‘prescribes’ 
the desirable moral conduct for those on top of the social and economic 
ladder. Solidarity, on the other hand, emerges from situations in which 
people recognize each other as equal, and thus entitled to the same rights 
and living conditions. We act in solidarity when we want to alleviate some 
sort of injustice or respond to its consequences (whether man- or nature-
made). Hence, the social values underlying solidarity are equality and 
justice, mutually intertwined, as the just order is seen, in this respect, as 
the order of equality.
I would also contend that solidarity is defined as an act (or a condition for 
acting, and for living) when we simultaneously give something and give up 
on something (again, a levelling occurs). To be in solidarity with thus implies 
the sharing of a position or experience with those who need or seek solidar-
ity, and a partaking in their situation. This also means that acts of solidar-
ity do not necessarily have to be acts at all (in the sense of agency). Some-
times, it is with inaction, with a refusal to act, or with self-censorship that 
we show our solidarity. This point is illuminated by an answer Judith Butler 
gave to the question ‘What does solidarity mean to you?’ in a recent inter-
view: “Solidarity means that you stay in the group with others because you 
share the feeling of revolt or injustice and you want to change the world, 
and you stay with that group even though you may not like all the people 
there … it asks a lot of your time, it means spending your time with people 
you do not necessarily like, it asks of you to give up on the simplicity of 
your private life… it means to stay with the group and to stay together to 
attain the shared goal”.3 Solidarity thus imposes limits on our individual 
agency, and to individualism in general, stressing the higher importance of 
3  The interview can be found on: http://www.rwfund.org/2015/11/25/judith-
butler-zadrzati-fokus/, last accessed Feb 1 2016. 
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a group cause or principle we share with others. In other words, some sort 
of communalism is always implied in solidarity.
Now, returning to the question of citizenship – and keeping in mind its par-
ticular historical and political meanings, its different frameworks, and the 
various interpretations of the internal force of citizens’ solidarity – we can ask 
again, within citizenship, where do potentials for engaging solidarity exist?
Since citizenship is still predominantly a state-bound concept, let me begin 
with this ‘traditional’ understanding of it, involving constitutional protections 
of statuses and rights and established norms for relations among members. 
State citizenship has an almost asymptotic relationship with equality, striving 
to attain it as a proper constitutive ideal, but constantly reproducing internal 
hierarchies and classes of not-so-equal citizens. Solidarity thus produces 
tensions with citizenship, not only regarding the exclusionary nature of the 
latter, but also, in a narrower sense, regarding failures to accommodate the 
equality of the statuses, rights and identities of all citizens. In this respect, 
solidarity could hardly be expected to perform as anything more than a 
corrective, or as a warning of the need for more inclusive communal citizen-
ship in which identities are not entrenched but work toward stabilizing a 
shared political identity. Yet, a formula by which political freedoms and 
social equality can co-exist must still be found. The welfare state’s model of 
social citizenship is, in my mind (however pessimistic this may seem), the 
pinnacle of institutionalized solidarity within the modern nation-state – with 
systems of taxation that rely on inter-generational, inter-regional and social 
and economic solidarity. The biggest threats to this model are current aus-
terity measures and politically-manipulated narratives of changing ethnic 
and ‘cultural’ balances. Here, we should consider the dangers of what Richard 
Sennett called “the destructive solidarity of us-against-them”: “The perverse 
power of solidarity, in its us-against-them form, remains alive in the civil 
societies of liberal democracies, as in European attitudes toward ethnic im-
migrants who seem to threaten social solidarity, or in American demands 
for a return to ‘family values’.” (Sennett 2013: 279). These threats need to 
be challenged and opposed from the position that social solidarity is es-
sential for building just and equal citizenship communities. In that sense, 
Rorty was right to point out that “feelings of solidarity are necessarily a 
matter of which similarities and dissimilarities strike us as salient, and that 
such salience is a function of a historically contingent final vocabulary … we 
should create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have 
and we should take into account those we instinctively think of as ‘they’ 
rather than ‘us’” (Rorty 1989: 192, emphasis added). However, I want to 
underline that solidarity, within this frame (of state-bound citizenship), 
inevitably remains ‘thin’ and expected to ‘work’ inside state boundaries, and 
is thus susceptible to a loss of its argumentative power when confronted 
with dangers presented as ‘external’.
383
  ENGAGING REFLEXIVITY, REFLECTING ENGAGEMENT
International solidarity – of the kind scholars and activists predominantly 
have in mind when exploring and engaging the concept – expresses the 
ideals of equality and justice more purely, in a broader political space that 
transcends nation-states and encompasses the whole of humanity. In-
stances of international solidarity can indeed be political in that they are 
capable of forming institutional relationships and challenging power relations, 
as well as creating new ones. But this comes with significant limitations, 
especially related to the durability of such endeavours – which usually do 
not produce lasting political formations, let alone political communities – 
and due to the fact that they do not significantly challenge state institutions, 
which remain the primary locus of political power managing our statuses, 
mobility and fundamental rights.
Finally, models of international, global citizenship – despite the criticism 
they receive for overstretching the concept of citizenship – are important 
to bear in mind when thinking about the prospects for linking solidarity 
and citizenship. These models rely on a vocabulary of rights, obligations 
and durable institutions, and take into account the global condition of 
citizens’ universal rights, thus embarking on an attempt to define, how-
ever loosely, the global community of citizens. Isin and Turner’s thoughts 
on cosmopolitan citizenship, for example, resonate particularly loudly right 
now, as the world faces one of the biggest refugee crises in recent history. 
For, when we travel or move abroad, we move from one citizenship regime4 
to another, retaining some of the entitlements from the previous regime 
and expecting protection from the one in which we are entering. Or at least 
this is what some of us expect and receive. We take these rights to mobility 
and protection of our interests for granted, as established freedoms won 
some time ago. However, at this very moment, we are witnessing constraints 
on the freedom of movement, the protection of human rights and the right 
to seek asylum. In debates about the refugee crisis in Europe, the cost of 
accommodating refugees is often raised, and is used by many member 
countries as a pretext for not dealing with the issue. And though it is 
clearly not the only contestable question, the recent deal between the EU 
and Turkey did reveal that accommodating a great influx of population 
comes with a price tag. If we could reach a global consensus that human 
destinies should never be made subject to budgetary negotiations, would 
it not make sense to develop an international system of taxation – of the 
4  Citizenship regime as defined by Shaw and Štiks (2012: 311) encompasses “the 
citizenship laws, regulations and administrative practices regarding the citizenship 
status of individuals but, in addition to that, it also refers to existing mechanisms of 
political participation. More precisely, a citizenship regime is based on a given country’s 
citizenship legislation defining the body of citizens (i.e. who is entitled to citizenship 
and all duties and rights attached to that status), on administrative policies in dealing 
with citizenship matters and the status of individuals, and, finally, on the official or 
non-official dynamic of political inclusion and exclusion.”
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global mobility of both people and capital – that could transform the 
privilege enjoyed by some into an assistance fund for others? This would 
incorporate both elements of citizenship and solidarity; and yet, this 
model has its limits as well, for it does not include partaking in shared 
experiences and it supports equality and justice in a very restricted manner. 
Therefore, this is another variant of a ‘thin’ form of solidarity, devoid from 
direct involvement and bottom-up action.
With no current plausible linkage between ‘thick’ solidarity and citizenship, 
the relationship between these two mutually-related concepts remains open 
but is nevertheless crucial for further thinking about the politically trans-
formative potential of solidarity. Citizenship’s essential ideal of equality 
must be formulated in such a way that it does not create tensions between 
unity and inclusion (a dilemma Sennett sees as overlapping with the dis-
putes between the political Left and the Social Left, Sennett 2013: 39–40) 
– where unity justifies exclusionary measures, and inclusion (diversity) is 
said to weaken unity. And solidarity’s appealing force should not too readily 
be attributed to its presupposed universal character: solidarity is instead a 
process, in which joint effort and work is a necessity, that does not rely on 
any universal presumption but is itself “a universalizing political relation” 
(Featherstone 2012: 38) rooted in concepts of rights, status and a sense of 
shared membership, epitomized best in the notion of citizenship.
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Jelena Vasiljević
Mogućnosti i ograničenja angažovanja solidarnosti u građanstvu
Rezime
U ši rem smi slu, ovaj rad se ba vi so li dar no šću kao po li tič ki ope ra tiv nim poj mom. 
Ka ko bi smo mo gli da od go vo ri mo na op šti ja pi ta nja, po put: Šta zna či za sno va ti 
po li tič ku za jed ni cu na prin ci pi ma so li dar no sti? Mo gu li ak ti so li dar no sti po slu ži ti ne 
sa mo kao po moć (po dr ška) dru gi ma, već i u ci lju pro me ne od no sa mo ći i kon sti tu i sa-
nja no vih po li tič kih po re da ka, is pr va mo ra mo po zi ci o ni ra ti so li dar nost spram ne kih 
već eta bli ra nih okvi ra mi šlje nja o po li tič koj za jed ni ci. U ovom ra du raz mo tri ću 
po li tič ku vred nost so li dar no sti unu tar raz li či tih te o ri ja i mo de la gra đan tva. Kao 
pr vo, uko li ko nas za ni ma so li dar nost iz van izo lo va nih ge sta i ak ci ja, te uko li ko 
is pi tu je mo op šti je ka pa ci te te ovog poj ma za pro iz vo đe nje no vih po li tič kih po re-
da ka, mo ra mo ga usi dri ti u po sto ja ne, a ipak do volj no ši ro ke kon cep tu al ne okvi re 
ko ji sa dr že u se bi pro ble me ide a la i vi zi ja po li tič ke za jed ni ce. Bez sum nje, gra-
đan stvo je je dan ta kav okvir. Uz to, sko ro da i ne ma te o ri je ili si ste mat skog pri-
stu pa gra đan stvu ko ji ne pod ra zu me va ne ke od aspe ka ta so li dar no sti kao svo je 
ele men tar ne po stav ke. Ko nač no, u bli skoj ve zi s pret hod no re če nim, gra đan stvo 
i so li dar nost, iako sto je u poj mov noj sve zi, sa či nja va ju pa ra dok sa lan par iz če ga 
se mo gu pro iz ve sti i ne ki bu du ći po ten ci jal ni pa ra dok si s ob zi rom na po du hva te 
an ga žo va nja so li dar no sti kao po li tič kog prin ci pa. Ukrat ko, gra đan stvo je ujed no 
in klu zi van i is klju ču ju ći po jam, ko ji u se bi sa dr ži ide ju gra ni ce ko ja ob u hva ta te lo 
gra đan stva (naj če šće, ma da ne is klju či vo, gra ni ce na ci je-dr ža ve), dok so li dar nost 
uglav nom gu bi svoj smi sao uko li ko se oče ku je da bu de pri me nji va na unu tar od-
re đe nih na met nu tih gra ni ca.
Ključ ne re či: so li dar nost, gra đan stvo, gra đan ska pra va, jed na kost, prav da, glo-
bal no gra đan stvo
